Hermeneutics of events: Can a man speak for God?

Perkasa’s Zul Noordin celebrates Karpal’s death as clearing path for hudud | Malaysia | The Malay Mail Online: Datuk Zulkifli Noordin



He
wrote using his Twitter handle @zulkiflinoordin, "Allah has killed off
Karpal who was the major opponent of its implementation!"



Datuk
Zulkifli Noordin in making this remark presumes that he knows the mind
and intentions of God. Is this good theology?



Puny Man, often in ignorant pride, claims to
speak for God. Let's consider another plausible scenario. We may also
interpret Karpal's death as God's Justice removing a floodgate that has
kept back the brackish water of evils and injustices. Why? To let evil
show its true colors and to face its final condemnation.



Which of these two interpretations is correct?  Perhaps neither or both interpretations are correct. There could be other understandings for this tragic event.



Event interpretation is prejudicial. 



Foucault argues that the episteme of an age condtions one's understanding of "Truth".

 

Philosophy is not like science

Please Stop Contributing to the Publish-or-Perish Landfill

by Wes Alwan on April 9, 2014 |

Bernard Williams was the rare academic who was also a great writer. In his review of Williams’ Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Paul Sagar lets academia have it:

We can now see that Williams was not lazy: he spent an immense amount of time reading and thinking, and knew much beyond his own academic arguments. What he chose to do was spend time thinking about things that most interested him, rather than engaging in the Sisyphean task of attempting to stay up to date with the vast and ever-expanding sea of contemporary scholarship, which tirelessly throws out publication after publication in every conceivable niche of enquiry. It is undeniable that the vast majority of present scholarly output in philosophy and attendant disciplines is of a poor standard: it is either unoriginal, original at the expense of being preposterous and tiresomely pointless or trivial, or else diligent and robust but utterly devoid of interest to anybody other than those academics who have made a career out of grinding out points and counterpoints within debates that only exist because of the very professionalization of intellectual pursuits of which their activity is a function. Williams chose to bypass all of this and get on with being original and interesting. It is not at all clear that he was making a mistake.
The present government’s Kafkaesque “Research Excellence Framework” demands that academics churn out publications, regardless of whether they have anything to say. More generally, there has been a pronounced cultural shift in professionalized academia away from teaching and towards measurable ‘outputs’, encouraging academics to translate whatever modest or untenable ideas they have into high ‘impact’ publications. Academia is in danger of ending up moribund via a prolonged case of morbid obesity. Williams’s advice was the exact opposite of all of this: disciplines like philosophy should not encourage, or give incentives for, publishing, unless what one writes is likely to be very good indeed; likely to be both genuinely interesting and original.
…
Philosophy is not like [science]: in philosophy, you are not only not adding data if you are making bad, or unoriginal, or stupid, or pointlessly banal and repetitive arguments, you are getting in the way of those who are trying to make sense of our world, and who might be able to make more sense of it than those who have tried before.

– Wes Alwan