What is History: Facts or Social Constructions

Do not fear historical interpretations - Columnist - New Straits Times:



Everywhere, historians and non-historians alike distort history. Therefore, it is important for all citizens to develop a mastery of historical literacy.



One aspect of historical literacy is to use history and its theories as tools of thought. The authentic search for knowledge empowers ordinary citizens to be clear in their thinking and not gullible in the use of history as indoctrination and propaganda.

In Praise of Idleness

"I think that there is far too much work done in the world, that immense harm is caused by the belief that work is virtuous.

I want to say, in all seriousness, that a great deal of harm is being done in the modern world by belief in the virtuousness of work, and that the road to happiness and prosperity lies in an organized diminution of work. " observes Russell.

"The morality of work is the morality of slaves, and the modern world has no need of slavery," he adds.

"I remember hearing an old Duchess say: 'What do the poor want with holidays? They ought to work.'  People nowadays are less frank, but the sentiment persists, and is the source of much of our economic confusion."

Without the need to work, there's more time for leisure, for doing what we really enjoy.

 Read In Praise Of Idleness by Bertrand Russell

Why Should We Worship God: An Argument Against God's Existence

There is a wide consensus among theists that it is obligatory for us to worship God. For example, Richard Swinburne writes, ‘Worship is obligatory – it is the proper response of respect by man to his creator.’ (Richard Swinburne (1981). Faith and Reason, Oxford, Clarendon Press)

Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it.

In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic.

We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and suggest that it might be taken to provide an argument against God’s existence, since theists generally regard it is a necessary truth that we ought to worship God.

Read Grounds for Worship and I Can't Make You Worship Me

An Immortal Life Would Be Unbearably Boring

If we can prolong life endlessly, it would not be desirable.

An immortal life would have satisfied all its desires and achieved its goals. There is nothing left to do, but boredom.

Bernard Williams in "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" in Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp.82-100,  argued that immortal individuals would be utterly bored with unchanging desires.

Read Bernard Williams article "The Makropulos Case"

A Reply to Bernard Williams argument.

Anscombe: Without God There is No Need To Speak Of Absolute Shoulds

Topic for #88: G.E.M. Anscombe on Ethical Judgment and Action |

Anscombe says that we only think in terms of moral laws and obligations because Christianity was dominant in our culture for so long.

It is as if the notion “criminal” were to remain when
criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten. A Hume discovering this situation might conclude that there was a special sentiment, expressed by “criminal,” which alone gave the word its sense.
So Hume discovered the situation which the notion “obligation” survived, and the notion “ought” was invested with that peculiar for having which it is said to be used in a “moral” sense, but in which the belief in divine law had long since been abandoned: for it was
substantially given up among Protestants at the time of the Reformation. The situation, if I am right, was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one.

 Anscombe thinks that we also need to distinguish again between the intended (you are responsible for whether you do the unethical deed or not) and the merely foreseen (you are not responsible for this foreseen event that you do not intend).


G E M Anscombe on Moral Philosophy

Hermeneutics of events: Can a man speak for God?

Perkasa’s Zul Noordin celebrates Karpal’s death as clearing path for hudud | Malaysia | The Malay Mail Online: Datuk Zulkifli Noordin



He
wrote using his Twitter handle @zulkiflinoordin, "Allah has killed off
Karpal who was the major opponent of its implementation!"



Datuk
Zulkifli Noordin in making this remark presumes that he knows the mind
and intentions of God. Is this good theology?



Puny Man, often in ignorant pride, claims to
speak for God. Let's consider another plausible scenario. We may also
interpret Karpal's death as God's Justice removing a floodgate that has
kept back the brackish water of evils and injustices. Why? To let evil
show its true colors and to face its final condemnation.



Which of these two interpretations is correct?  Perhaps neither or both interpretations are correct. There could be other understandings for this tragic event.



Event interpretation is prejudicial. 



Foucault argues that the episteme of an age condtions one's understanding of "Truth".

 

Philosophy is not like science

Please Stop Contributing to the Publish-or-Perish Landfill

by Wes Alwan on April 9, 2014 |

Bernard Williams was the rare academic who was also a great writer. In his review of Williams’ Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Paul Sagar lets academia have it:

We can now see that Williams was not lazy: he spent an immense amount of time reading and thinking, and knew much beyond his own academic arguments. What he chose to do was spend time thinking about things that most interested him, rather than engaging in the Sisyphean task of attempting to stay up to date with the vast and ever-expanding sea of contemporary scholarship, which tirelessly throws out publication after publication in every conceivable niche of enquiry. It is undeniable that the vast majority of present scholarly output in philosophy and attendant disciplines is of a poor standard: it is either unoriginal, original at the expense of being preposterous and tiresomely pointless or trivial, or else diligent and robust but utterly devoid of interest to anybody other than those academics who have made a career out of grinding out points and counterpoints within debates that only exist because of the very professionalization of intellectual pursuits of which their activity is a function. Williams chose to bypass all of this and get on with being original and interesting. It is not at all clear that he was making a mistake.
The present government’s Kafkaesque “Research Excellence Framework” demands that academics churn out publications, regardless of whether they have anything to say. More generally, there has been a pronounced cultural shift in professionalized academia away from teaching and towards measurable ‘outputs’, encouraging academics to translate whatever modest or untenable ideas they have into high ‘impact’ publications. Academia is in danger of ending up moribund via a prolonged case of morbid obesity. Williams’s advice was the exact opposite of all of this: disciplines like philosophy should not encourage, or give incentives for, publishing, unless what one writes is likely to be very good indeed; likely to be both genuinely interesting and original.
…
Philosophy is not like [science]: in philosophy, you are not only not adding data if you are making bad, or unoriginal, or stupid, or pointlessly banal and repetitive arguments, you are getting in the way of those who are trying to make sense of our world, and who might be able to make more sense of it than those who have tried before.

– Wes Alwan